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Abstract 
The article covers main stages of integration processes in the CIS area since 
its formation. We analyzed the specifics of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) in 
the CIS. We prepared an exhaustive list of expired and currently effective PTAs in 
the CIS area, taking into account the initial levels of exemptions and the dynamics 
of their cancellations. We analyzed qualitatively and quantitatively the economic 
aspects of PTAs. We discussed further integration agenda of the Russian 
Federation and a role of PTAs as a tool of international economic integration. 
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Introduction 
First steps towards regional integration, both trade and political, were made 
following the dissolution of the USSR1. 
On the one hand, post-soviet states were interdependent and integrated since 
they emerged from planned economy and were influenced by historical ties; on the 
other hand, republics were deeply reluctant to creation of supranational structures 
limiting national sovereignty2. Aforementioned factors were simultaneously 
driving and restraining further development of international relations. 
Early preferential trade agreements were mainly concluded to legitimize 
absence of customs administrative infrastructure, lack of controls over cross-border 
trade and ossification of economic relations that is a characteristic of a planned 
economy were the most influential conditions leading to conclusion of agreements. 
Various subregional trade agreements were hastily concluded in order to 
solve problems of the time, especially problems of domestic shortages of consumer 
goods and lack of control over prices on them. Rapid changes in political and 
economic situation resulted in the fact that decisions regarding trade preferences 
and exemptions from PTAs as well as legislation on import and export tariffs were 
based not on in-depth qualitative or quantitative analysis of factors or results but 
rather followed intuitive assumptions of leaders of countries. Given decisions 
undoubtedly played an important role from a political point of view, but by and 
large were secondary taking into account fleeting nature of economic processes of 
the time.  
Trade liberalization of 1992 has created powerful incentives for further 
development of trade relations between Russia and foreign countries3. Significant 
imbalance between prices on goods within post-soviet states and the ones in the 
outside countries stimulated external trade, which became the most dynamically 
                                                          
1 Agreement from 12/08/1991 on creation of CIS between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan and subsequently joined 
by other CIS countries simultaneously was a de jure confirmation of the fact that “USSR as a subject of international 
law and geopolitical reality ceases to exist”. 
2 Development of partnership trade agreements in CIS area// UN, Committee for Trade, Industry and Enterprise, 
Geneva, May, 2005. 
3 Since that starting that moment “…optimum decisions in the field of monetary, trade and industrial policy are no 
longer given, they are influenced by what is going on in the world”. For more details about turn to free trade and 
change in economic conditions refer to Gaidar Y. «A Long View» // 568 pp., The MIT Press, 2012 
developing sector and the only source of foreign currency inflow in the first years 
of reforms. In addition, import purchases were helping to meet the domestic 
demand on consumer goods in the circumstances of deep industrial decline, 
including food and light industries. Liberalization of import was crucial to creation 
of competitive environment in extremely monopolistic domestic market as well as 
compensation of drastic decline in production levels of Russian industry4. 
Oppositely, a large number of Russian enterprises entered the foreign market 
as a result of export liberalization, most of which did not have any prior experience 
in foreign trade, leading to increase in competition between them and worsening of 
conditions of import-export transactions5. 
Russian exporters sought to obtain currency by any means with no regard to 
material costs or world prices. Breach of parity in contractual and world prices 
resulted not only in significant decrease in currency income, but also in decrease in 
world prices on a number of goods undermining credibility of Russia as a trading 
partner. 
A large number of Russian and foreign articles dedicated to drivers of 
political integration in post-soviet area have already been written. We will focus on 
qualitative and quantitative economical aspects of the concluded agreements 
leaving aside the political discussions. 
We will specify the key terms used in the paper below. 
We determine trade integration as the process of increasing a country's 
participation in world markets through trade, accomplished by trade liberalization6. 
Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) will be determined as agreements 
between the parties (countries or blocs) that levy lower (or zero) tariffs against 
imports from members than outsiders7. 
                                                          
4An Economy in Transition. Essays on the Economic Policy of Post-communist Russia (1991 - 1997)// Institute for 
the Economy in Transition, Moscow ,1998, pp. 829 
5 An Economy in Transition. Essays on the Economic Policy of Post-communist Russia (1991 - 1997)// Institute for 
the Economy in Transition, Moscow ,1998, pp. 829 
6 Deardorff’s Glossary of International Economics:  
www.personal.umich.edu/~alandear/glossary/t.html 
7 Bhagwati J. & Panagariya A. (1996) The Theory of Preferential Trade Agreements: Historical Evolution and 
Current Trends, The American Economic Review, Vol. 86, No. 2, 1996 (May, 1996), pp. 82-87 
In accordance with the provisions of the PTA, the parties are obliged to 
provide each other more favorable treatment than to third countries8. Hence, in 
contrast to the multilateral terms of cooperation within the framework of the WTO, 
the conclusion of PTAs assumes discrimination of non-member countries. 
Despite the fact that the basic principles of the WTO are reciprocity and 
non-discrimination, XXIV article GATT / WTO authorizes the conclusion of PTAs 
under certain conditions9, provided such agreements favor the real expansion of the 
boundaries of free trade. 
Almost all existing forms of integration in the world, one way or another, are 
PTAs to the extent which they are aimed at the liberalization of economic relations 
between the member parties in relation to third countries. One can list among such 
forms of integration, for example, OECD and APEC, which are not formally 
classified as PTAs. In what follows, we will focus on the analysis of PTAs in the 
former Soviet Union: their nature, types and characteristics.  
 
Initiation of trade negotiations in the CIS area 
The first attempt to create a multilateral FTA in the CIS area (including 
Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, 
Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan, excluding Turkmenistan) was made in 
April 199410. The agreement was expected to come into force after the signing 
parties agree on the list of exemptions from it. Parties were not able to reach an 
agreement despite numerous attempts to update given agreement by adapting it to 
the national legislation of each of the parties11, and the development of several 
documents governing the preparations12 to the establishment of a free trade zone in 
the CIS. Hence multilateral PTA did not exist in the CIS area until the end of 2012. 
                                                          
8 Recent PTAs include provisions on trade in services as well as goods, trade remedy measures, capital and labor 
movement, dispute settlement, intellectual property, etc 
9 For more information, refer to GATT Art.XXIV on Regional trade agreements: 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/10-24.pdf 
10 CIS Agreement from 15.04.1994 "On the establishment of a free trade area" 
11 Protocol for the amendments to the agreement on the establishment of free trade from 15 April 1994 from 
02.04.99 
12 In accordance with several decisions of the Council of CIS Heads of State during 2000-2004 
Along with (unsuccessful) attempts to create a multilateral PTA individual 
countries were negotiating bilaterally, concluding agreements in relatively short 
time followed by subsequent approval of the list of reciprocal exemptions and 
simultaneous agreements on terms of their elimination. 
One should mention that in addition to list of exemptions from import 
tariff13 each of the given agreements included full exemptions from export tariff. 
Meaning that the countries continued to apply export duties with respect to a listing 
of goods that were subject to export duties when traded with non-member 
countries (accordingly, second party had a right to impose additional import duties 
on the same product group).  
In the early - mid 90's the listing of goods subject to export duties in the 
Russian Federation was relatively wide, which was explained by the necessity of 
curbing the growth of domestic prices. In the late 1990's and early 2000's the list of 
products falling under the export tariff legislation has been significantly reduced, 
mostly down to the fuel and energy resources and metals. 
Summary table including information on PTAs effective in 2013 in the CIS 
area is presented below. 
                                                          
13 Listing of goods subject to import duties 
Table 1 – PTAs in the CIS area 
  Arm Aze Geo Kir Mol Taj Uzb Bel Kaz Rus Tur Ukr 
Arm X NO 95-curr: FTA (bl) 
94-11: FTA (bl)* 
11-curr: FTA CIS* 
93-11: FTA (bl) 
11-curr: FTA CIS* 11-curr: FTA CIS* NO 
00-11: FTA (bl)* 
11-curr: FTA CIS* 
01-11: FTA (bl) 
11-curr: FTA CIS* 
04-11: FTA (bl)* 
11-curr: FTA CIS* 96-curr: FTA (bl) 
96-11: FTA (bl) 
11-curr: FTA CIS* 
Азе NO X 96-curr: FTA (bl) NO NO NO NO NO NO 93-curr: FTA (bl)* NO 96-curr: FTA (bl) 
Geo 95-curr: FTA (bl) 96-curr: FTA (bl) X NO NO NO NO NO 97-curr: FTA (bl)* 94-curr: FTA (bl)* 96-curr: FTA (bl) 95-curr: FTA (bl) 
Kir 
94-11: FTA (bl)* 
11-curr: FTA CIS* NO NO X 
95-11: FTA (bl) 
11-curr: FTA CIS* 
99-11: FTA (bl)*02 
11-curr: FTA CIS* 96-curr: FTA (bl)* 
99-11: FTA (bl) 
11-curr: FTA CIS* 
95-11: FTA (bl) 
11-curr: FTA CIS* 
92-11: FTA (bl) 
11-curr: FTA CIS* NO 
95-11: FTA (bl) 
11-curr: FTA CIS* 
Mol 
93-11: FTA (bl) 
11-curr: FTA CIS* NO NO 
95-11: FTA (bl) 
11-curr: FTA CIS* X 11-curr: FTA CIS* NO 
93-11: FTA (bl) 
11-curr: FTA CIS* 11-curr: FTA CIS* 
93-11: FTA (bl)* 
11-curr: FTA CIS* NO 11-curr: FTA CIS* 
Taj 11-curr: FTA CIS* NO NO 
99-11: FTA (bl)*02 
11-curr: FTA CIS* 11-curr: FTA CIS* X NO 
98-11: FTA (bl) 
11-curr: FTA CIS* 
95-11: FTA (bl)*95 
11-curr: FTA CIS* 
92-11: FTA (bl)*95 
11-curr: FTA CIS* NO 
01-11: FTA (bl) 
11-curr: FTA CIS* 
Uzb NO NO NO 96-curr: FTA (bl)* NO NO X NO NO 92-curr: FTA (bl)* NO NO 
Bel 
00-11: FTA (bl)* 
11-curr: FTA CIS* NO NO 
99-11: FTA (bl) 
11-curr: FTA CIS* 
93-11: FTA (bl) 
11-curr: FTA CIS* 
98-11: FTA (bl) 
11-curr: FTA CIS* NO X 
97-10: FTA (bl) 
10-curr: CU 
11-curr: FTA CIS* 
12-curr: CES 
92-10: FTA (bl)*95 
10-curr: CU 
11-curr: FTA CIS* 
12-curr: CES NO 
92-11: FTA (bl)* 
11-curr: FTA CIS* 
Kaz 
01-11: FTA (bl) 
11-curr: FTA CIS* NO 97-curr: FTA (bl)* 
95-11: FTA (bl) 
11-curr: FTA CIS* 11-curr: FTA CIS* 
95-11: FTA (bl)*95 
11-curr: FTA CIS* NO 
97-10: FTA (bl) 
10-curr: CU 
11-curr: FTA CIS* 
12-curr: CES X 
92-10: FTA (bl)*95 
10-curr: CU 
11-curr: FTA CIS* 
12-curr: CES NO 
94-11: FTA (bl) 
11-curr: FTA CIS* 
Rus 
04-11: FTA (bl)* 
11-curr: FTA CIS* 93-curr: FTA (bl)* 94-curr: FTA (bl)* 
92-11: FTA (bl) 
11-curr: FTA CIS* 
93-11: FTA (bl)* 
11-curr: FTA CIS* 
92-11: FTA (bl)*95 
11-curr: FTA CIS* 92-curr: FTA (bl)* 
92-10: FTA (bl)*95 
10-curr: CU 
11-curr: FTA CIS* 
12-curr: CES 
92-10: FTA (bl)*95 
10-curr: CU 
11-curr: FTA CIS* 
12-curr: CES X 92-curr: FTA (bl)* 
93-11: FTA (bl)* 
11-curr: FTA CIS* 
Tur 96-curr: FTA (bl) NO 96-curr: FTA (bl) NO NO NO NO NO NO 92-curr: FTA (bl)* X 95-curr: FTA (bl) 
Ukr 
96-11: FTA (bl) 
11-curr: FTA CIS* 96-curr: FTA (bl) 95-curr: FTA (bl) 
95-11: FTA (bl) 
11-curr: FTA CIS* 11-curr: FTA CIS* 
01-11: FTA (bl) 
11-curr: FTA CIS* NO 
92-11: FTA (bl)* 
11-curr: FTA CIS* 
94-11: FTA (bl) 
11-curr: FTA CIS* 
93-11: FTA (bl)* 
11-curr: FTA CIS* 95-curr: FTA (bl) X 
(bl) – bilateral agreement                       
99 year of the signing the protocol on the 
complete abolition of exemptions from the 
free trade                       
*PTA with 
exemptions 
CU – Customs 
union 
CES – Common 
economic space                         
In force                         
Signed, but inactive                       
No agreement                       
Source: Listing of bilateral international agreements of the Russian Federation – Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation, Consultant Plus Database, 
PravoInform Database, World Bank Global PTA Database, APEC FTAs/RTAs Database, WTO PTA Database, UNESCAP PTA Database, ARIC PTA Database 
 Bilateral FTAs concluded in the CIS area shared the following common 
features: 
• Open and relatively wide range of asymmetric exemptions at the stage 
of the agreement conclusion, which is included into a separate protocol and is 
expected to be narrowed within agreed upon timeline14; 
• Agreements were not permanent by nature, they could have been 
reviewed and corrected substantially, following certain situational political 
reasons; 
• Agreements left a room for imposing trade remedies, antidumping and 
countervailing duties, and the possibility of the use of quantitative trade restrictions 
using virtually any justification. This subsequently led to numerous trade wars in 
the CIS area. 
The substantial structure of some of the agreements containing main 
chapters is presented in Figure 1. Given structure is designed by means of a binary 
labeling (simply count the number of points within each chapter) of PTAs effective 
in the CIS area using the structuring based on APEC PTAs database15. 
                                                          
14 There were no penalties if deadlines for reaching the agreement were not met 
15 Comparative Toolkit, Study on Identifying Convergences and Divergences in APEC FTAs/RTAs: 
http://fta.apec.org/search.aspx 
  
Figure 1 – Substantial structure of PTAs effective in the CIS area  
Sources: Listing of bilateral international agreements of the Russian Federation – Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation, Consultant Plus Database, 
PravoInform Database
 Figure 1 indicates differentiation in the PTAs: market access issues are 
addressed in every agreement, but only few of them include provisions on capital 
movement, trade in services and the harmonization of legislation. Multilateral 
agreements within the CIS (i.e. CIS FTA (founded in 2011), the Customs Union of 
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia (signed in 2010), Common economic space 
(created in 2012)) have a wider coverage of provisions than the bilateral ones. 
As mentioned above, initial list of exemptions, regarding both import and 
export, in nearly every bilateral FTA contained all goods that were subject to 
national export duties. Circa 71% of total turnover of the Russian Federation in 
1993 (73% of trade turnover with CIS countries)16 were subject to exemptions. 
Listing of exemptions to export tariff was significantly reduced over time as a 
result of shortening of number of goods subject to export duties in every country. 
Key exemptions from import tariffs were ethyl alcohol, cigars and cigarettes, 
white sugar and vodka – they were imposed by the countries, which were major 
producers of given goods in the CIS: Russia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Given 
products fell under excise law in the aforementioned countries. Other countries 
commonly applied symmetric or asymmetric restrictions on positions sensitive for 
them17. 
Exemptions have made a significant impact on the trade volumes and final 
price of goods subject to them18. However, we should mention that some countries 
successfully established full-fledged FTA through bilateral agreements (in written 
form - more on that below). 
For example, by the moment of ratification of the agreement on the Eurasian 
Economic Community in 2001 (between Russia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan 
and Kazakhstan), free trade regime without exemptions or limitations (both to 
import and export tariffs) was already established "on paper" through signed 
                                                          
16 Our assessment is based on the structure of import and export in 1996 (there is no available data on import and 
export in 1993 broken down by types of products). 
17 The most informative sources of information on restrictions to mutual trade in the CIS countries are the individual 
decisions of the Economic Council of the CIS, e.g. the decision "On the ongoing work on phased removal of 
exemptions to  free trade between states - members of the Commonwealth of Independent States" from 13 March 
2009. 
18 Freinkman L., Polyakov E., Revenco C. Trade Performance and Regional Integration of the CIS Countries // 
World Bank Working paper №. 38, Washington DC, 2004, p. 18 
 bilateral protocols on exemptions from the free trade regime (the dates of 
termination of exemptions - see Table 1 above). 
On the way to multilateral integration 
In parallel with the liberalization through bilateral FTAs and the attempts to 
launch a multilateral FTA other integration processes, liberalizing trade distortions 
were developing. 
For example, in 1995 was laid the foundation for the formation of the 
Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan (and transformed after the 
establishment of the EurAsEC in 2001 into EurAsEC Customs Union). EurAsEC 
initially included 5 countries – Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan19. Uzbekistan joined EurAsEC in 2006 but terminated its participation in 
2008. 
In accordance with the signed agreement, free trade regime without 
exceptions and limitations neither on the import, nor on export was established 
within EurAsEC. Member countries came to formation of a deeper level of 
integration (EurAsEC Customs Union) at different speed due to necessity to carry 
out a significant amount of preparatory activities (unification customs legislation, 
harmonization of customs classification of goods, coordination of general rates in 
relation to third countries, and so on). 
In fact, EurAsEC Customs Union took effect only by 2010-2011, when the 
member countries enforced the Customs Code and the transport and customs 
control has been moved to the outer borders of the three countries. 
Other linked issues concerning mutual economic and trade integration of 
Russia with neighbor countries are discussed within the framework of existing 
integration organizations such as the Union State of Russia and Belarus, and the 
Common Economic Space of EurAsEC. The activities of given forms of 
integration indirectly affect trade between member countries through regulations of 
                                                          
19 Agreement on establishment of EurAsEC was signed on 10 October 2000 and came into force on 30 May 2011 
after ratification by all member countries. 
 capital and labor movement, technical regulations and support measures for 
agriculture. 
Thus the basic documents contributing to trade liberalization within the CIS 
up to 2012 were the bilateral FTAs, and despite their consistent development, 
member countries in fact were always able to impose restrictive (tariff, non-tariff 
and quantitative) measures in trade, bypassing the existing rules. "List of restrictive 
measures in force in the foreign markets for Russian goods20" published by the 
Ministry of Economic Development monthly is an evidence of such restrictions. 
Certain restrictions caused symmetrical or asymmetrical response in most cases21. 
The Russian Federation also actively imposes various restrictive measures 
that are treated by partners as violation of FTAs or agreements on creation of 
common economic space. For example, in the case of Belarus, despite 
establishment of free trade regime without exemptions and limitations in 1995, 
discussions regarding justification of imposing export duty on Russian oil supplied 
to Belarus often arose at the state level over the last decade. Temporary 
compromise is reached periodically by the parties regarding the issue22, but one 
way or another, given question along with the pricing of Russian gas23, always 
arises on discussions of trade disputes in the CIS. 
                                                          
20 Archive of such statements is incomplete. Examples of restrictions applied in Belarus on Russian goods as at 1 
April 2012: 
• Lack of national treatment to Russian goods and services with regard to their admission to public 
procurement in the Republic of Belarus. The measure applies to all products, including agricultural. 
• Import into the country of tobacco products is permitted only through special importers defined by the 
President of the Republic of Belarus. 
• Import into the country of alcohol products is permitted only through special importers defined by the 
President of the Republic of Belarus. 
• Restriction of access of medical products and medical devices (Information letter of Ministry of Health of the 
Republic of Belarus from 29.07.2011 # 12-1-10/833-763). 
• Restricted listing of wholesale operators, import volumes and the list of imported goods (Council of Ministers 
of the Republic of Belarus from 12.05.2011 # 601). 
• Other. 
21 In the form of restrictions of trade with regard to a particular product groups. 
22 Specifically calculated export duty on oil exported to Belarus was agreed upon in 2007, starting from 1 January 
2010 oil imported for internal consumption is not subject to export duty, the surplus is subject to a standard export 
duty. 
23 Disputes regarding gas are relatively easier and harder at the same time. In addition to the existing export duties 
on gas, the presence of the monopoly power of Gazprom results in existence of various discrimination schemes 
against trading partners. A significant difference in domestic prices for Russian gas in Russia and Belarus on the 
state level is a result of the Gazprom contract policy rather than the use of gas export duties for Belarus. 
 Full multilateral FTA in the CIS was formed in 2011 and came into force in 
the end of 2012 between the countries of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova, 
Russia and Ukraine (Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan signed but have not ratified the 
agreement by the end of 2012). Hallmark of given agreement is a high degree of 
consistency with internationally accepted rules (GATT and WTO). Key features of 
the agreement are the following: 
• abolition of quantitative restrictions except those permitted by Article 
XI of GATT 1994; 
• transit of goods and means of transportation are carried out in 
accordance with the provisions of Article V of the GATT; 
• special remedy measures in mutual trade are imposed only if they 
comply with the Article XIX of GATT 1994, the WTO Agreement on Safeguards;  
• Anti-dumping and countervailing measures in mutual trade must 
comply with Articles VI, XVI of GATT 1994, the WTO Agreement on 
Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994, the WTO Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures; 
• other. 
Listing of exemptions in multilateral FTA (2011-present) is presented in the 
table below. 
 
Table 2 – Exemptions from FTA in the CIS area regarding import 
  Armenia Kyrgyzstan Belarus Kazakhstan Russia Moldova Tajikistan Ukraine 
Armenia   24 - Tobacco 
Ukraine Does not apply   17 - Sugar 
12 – Oil seeds; 
17 - Sugar Does not apply   
Belarus Does not apply 17 - Sugar 
Kazakhstan Does not apply 17 - Sugar; 22 – Beverages and spirits 
Moldova Does not apply 17 - Sugar; 22 - Beverages and spirits 
Russia Does not apply 17 - Sugar 
Tajikistan Does not apply 
Kyrgyzstan Does not apply 
Source: summary compiled by authors based on the agreement on FTA (signed in Saint-Petersburg 18.10.2011) 
Table 3 – Exemptions from FTA in the CIS regarding export (by commodity groups) 
  Armenia Belarus Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Moldova Russia Tajikistan Ukraine 
Kyrgyzstan 04 47   04 47 
Armenia Does not apply 
Belarus 12 27 31 41 44 
Does not apply 
12 27 31 41 44 
  
12 27 31 41 44 
Kazakhstan 12 27 41 51 72 73 74 76 86 12 27 41 51 72 73 74 76 86 12 27 41 51 72 73 74 76 86 
Russia 
03 12 16 22 25 26 27 28 29 31 39 41 44 47 48 71 72 73 74 
75 76 78 79 80 81 86 
03 12 16 22 25 26 27 28 29 31 39 41 
44 47 48 71 72 73 74 75 76 78 79 80 
81 86 
03 12 16 22 25 26 27 28 29 31 39 
41 44 47 48 71 72 73 74 75 76 78 
79 80 81 86 
Tajikistan 01 02 07 08 13 20 27 41 50 51 52 71 72 74 75 76 78 79 80 Does not pply 
01 02 07 08 13 
20 27 41 50 51 
52 71 72 74 75 
76 78 79 80 
Source: summary compiled by authors based on the agreement on FTA (signed in Saint-Petersburg 18.10.2011) 
 
Reference data: Listing of commodity groups 
 1 Live animals 
2 Meat and edible meat offal 
3 Fish and crustaceans 
4 Dairy, eggs, honey  
7 Edible vegetables 
8 Edible fruits and nuts, peel of citrus/melons 
12 Oil Seeds and oleaginous fruits 
13 Lac; gums, resins and other vegetable saps and 
extracts 
16 Preparations of meat, of fish or of crustaceans, 
molluscs or other aquatic invertebrates 
20 Preparations of vegetables, fruit, nuts or other parts 
of plants 
22 Beverages, spirits and vinegar 
25 Salt; sulphur; earths & stone; plastering materials; 
lime & cement 
26 Ores, slag and ash 
27 Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their 
distillation; bituminous substances; mineral waxes 
28 Inorganic chemicals; organic or inorganic compounds 
of precious metals, of rare-earth metals, of radioactive 
elements or of isotopes 
29 Organic chemicals 
 
31 Fertilisers 
39 Plastics and articles thereof 
44 Wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal 
47 Pulp of wood or of other fibrous cellulosic material; 
recovered (waste and scrap) of paper or paperboard 
48 Paper and paperboard; articles of paper pulp, of paper 
or of paperboard 
50 Silk 
51 Wool, fine or coarse animal hair, horse hair yarn and 
woven fabric 
52 Cotton 
71 Natural or cultured pearls, precious or semi-precious 
stones, precious metals, metals clad with precious metal, 
and articles thereof; imitation jewellery; coin 
72 Iron and steel 
73 Articles of iron or steel 
74 Copper and articles thereof 
75 Nickel and articles thereof 
76 Aluminium and articles thereof 
78 Lead and articles thereof 
79 Zinc and articles thereof 
80 Tin and articles thereof 
81 Other base metals; cermets articles thereof 
86 Railway or tramway locomotives, rolling-stock and 
parts thereof; rail-way or tramway track fixtures and 
fittingsand parts thereof; mechanical (including electro-
mechanical)traffic signalling equipment of all kinds 
Table 4 – Exemptions from FTA in the CIS (2011 – present) regarding import (as 
a % in total trade turnover between member countries of CIS FTA) 
  Armenia 
Kyrgyzsta
n Belarus Kazakhstan Russia Moldova Tajikistan Ukraine 
Armenia   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 
Ukraine Does not apply 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00   
Belarus Does not apply 0.01 
Kazakhstan Does not apply 0.03 
Moldova Does not apply 0.02 
Russia Does not apply 0.08 
Tajikistan Does not apply 
Kyrgyzstan Does not apply 
Source: calculations of authors based on the data of trade statistics 
Table 5 – Exemptions from FTA in the CIS (2011 – present) regarding export (as a 
% in total trade turnover between member countries of CIS FTA) 
  Armenia Belarus Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Moldova Russia Tajikistan Ukraine 
Kyrgyzstan 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Armenia Does not apply 
Ukraine Does not apply 
Belarus 0.00 
 
0.00 0.00 
Does not 
apply 
0.00 0.20 
Kazakhstan 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.52 
Russia 0.12 0.01 0.13 0.00 10.12 
Tajikistan 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.03 
 
0.01 
Source: calculations of authors based on the data of trade statistics 
 
 Amount of turnover subject to exemptions was equal to 11.3% of the total 
turnover between member countries of the CIS FTA (2011), while 10.1% of them 
relate to exemptions to export tariff imposed by Russia in respect of Ukraine. 
Thus, the conclusion of a new multilateral FTA between the countries of the 
CIS is a significant step forward in comparison with preferential trade relations in 
the post-Soviet space that were in force last 20 years. Earlier “trade wars” were 
common between parties to bilateral PTAs24. 
Aforementioned situation is partially explained by the fact that the criteria 
for the application of remedy measures in the bilateral agreements between the CIS 
members were not clearly defined and no formal sanctions for breaches of the 
agreement such as imposing "temporary" remedy measures for 5 or more years 
existed. 
The new FTA is focused on compliance with international law (including 
Articles VI, XVI, XXIV, XIX of GATT 1994) regarding the implementation by the 
parties of obligations outlined in this agreement. This is expected to result in 
reduced risks of opportunistic use of remedy measures by any member of given 
agreement, thus, in fact reduced trade barriers between countries. 
In addition, the volume of exemptions from total trade turnover between 
member countries of the CIS FTA significantly decreased compared to the 
limitations imposed by bilateral agreements, and now circa 90% of trade turnover 
between countries is carried out free of import and export duties with the 
remaining 10% of trade almost entirely relating to the exemptions to export tariff 
                                                          
24 For more information on trade wars between Poland, Ukraine, Moldavia and other CIS countries, please refer to 
•  Russian Economy in 2005. Tendencies and perspectives.// Institute for the Economy in Transition, issue 
27, Moscow, 2006, pp. 362 - 379; 
• Russian Economy in 2006. Tendencies and perspectives// Institute for the Economy in Transition, issue 28, 
Moscow, 2007, pp. 404 - 421; 
• Russian Economy in 2007. Tendencies and perspectives.// Institute for the Economy in Transition, issue 29, 
Moscow, 2008, pp. 312 - 334; 
• Russian Economy in 2008. Tendencies and perspectives.// Institute for the Economy in Transition, issue 30, 
Moscow, 2009, pp. 312 - 333; 
• Russian Economy in 2009. Tendencies and perspectives.// Institute for the Economy in Transition, issue 31, 
Moscow, 2010, pp. 350 - 367; 
• Russian Economy in 2010. Tendencies and perspectives.// Institute for the Economy in Transition, issue 32, 
Moscow, 2011, pp. 307 - 328; 
• Russian Economy in 2011. Tendencies and perspectives.// Institute for the Economy in Transition, issue 33, 
Moscow, 2012, pp. 311 – 334. 
 imposed by Russia against Ukraine. Such a substantial reduction in the amount of 
exemptions is undoubtedly a significant breakthrough in the field of trade policy of 
the CIS. However, we should mention that the assessment is carried out after 
possible changes of the trade patterns under the existing exemptions. 
 PTAs of the CIS member countries with non-members 
Russia and Moldova are the only countries in the CIS FTA (2011), who are 
parties to PTAs with non-member countries. 
The number of such agreements is insignificant, and the coverage of the 
issues discussed in given PTAs causes serious doubt on the economic motives of 
their appearance25, i.e. the motives based on the quantitative analysis of economic 
impacts of these agreements. 
Thus, in substance, Russia concluded only one PTA with non-CIS countries 
– the PTA with Serbia26 (initially the agreement was concluded in 2000 with the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia). The agreement is superficial (provisions within 
the agreement are mainly devoted to trade in goods, rules of origin and trade 
remedy measures), additionally, list of import exemptions is attached27. 
Moldova is significantly more active in trade negotiations than Russia. 
Current partners of Moldova through existing bilateral PTA's are: Albania, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro. 
Moreover, Moldova joined the Central European Free Trade Agreement 
(CEFTA) in 2007, the other members of which are the aforementioned partner 
countries of Moldova in bilateral agreements. In other words, Moldova and the 
listed countries are integrated through a set of bilateral agreements and one 
multilateral agreement. 
It should be noted that the former members of the CEFTA (Poland, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria и Romania) joined the European 
Union after withdrawal from the agreement. The intention of recent member 
countries of given agreement (e.g. Croatia, which has withdrawn from CEFTA in 
                                                          
25 Determinants of signing PTAs between countries are addressed in the framework of political economy. For 
example, refer to Grossman G., Helpman E. The Politics of Free-Trade Agreements// The American Economic 
Review, September 1995b, v. 85, no. 4, p. 667–690 
26 Some international databases contain information on existence of PTA between Russia and the European Union, 
e.g. refer to McGill Faculty of Law Preferential and Regional Trade Agreements Database: 
http://ptas.mcgill.ca/Pages%20ptas/A-Z/R.htm. 
In reality, this agreement is only a framework agreement on partnership and cooperation and cannot be regarded as 
PTA. 
27 Exemptions applicable to the following products: 
• Import in Russia from Serbia: meat, sugar, alcohol, tobacco, textile, new pneumatic tyres of rubber, some 
types of machinery and equipment; 
• Import in Serbia from Russia: new pneumatic tyres of rubber, some types of machinery and equipment. 
 the beginning 2013) to join the European Union in the near future suggests that 
CEFTA is a definite beachhead. It allows countries to harmonize legislation and 
institutions with European standards, in order to allow for further integration with 
the European Union. 
The PTA linkages in the CIS are represented schematically in the following 
figure: 
 
Figure 2 – PTA’s of CIS member countries 
Sources:  Listing of bilateral international agreements of the Russian 
Federation – Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation, 
Consultant Plus Database, PravoInform Database, World Bank Global PTA 
Database, APEC FTAs/RTAs Database, WTO PTA Database, UNESCAP 
PTA Database, ARIC PTA Database 
 
 Is there a future for PTAs? 
In the last two decades the number of PTAs has increased more than four-
fold and reached 300 active agreements today, besides each WTO member is party 
to 13 PTAs in average28. 
Russia de facto has only a few agreements that are literally aimed to reduce 
trade barriers among its members (FTA CIS (2011), EurAsEC Customs Union, 
Common Economic Space and to a lesser extent PTA with Serbia). 
Despite the avalanche growth of number of PTA's in the world in recent 
years that may be linked to the periodic multilateral trade negotiations difficulties 
(particularly the Doha Round of WTO negotiations remains uncertain) only 16% of 
world trade is covered by preferential benefits29 and larger part of world trade 
takes place on the basis of MFN30. 
In fact, PTA is not only a tool free trade promotion and addressing the issues 
of integration and harmonization, but also a mechanism of overcoming the crisis in 
multilateral trade negotiations. Analysis of the existing agreements in the CIS and 
the world31 has shown that the specific contents of PTA, i.e. depth of PTA 
provisions is more important than presence or absence of PTA. Currently a 
significant share world PTA are framework agreements by substance. 
In this paper we focus on particular features of PTAs rather than on the 
formal static analysis of the effects of PTA conclusion32. As a rule in academic 
research on the impact of PTAs on trade, conclusion of PTA assumes a reduction 
                                                          
28 The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements: From Co-existence to Coherence// World Trade Report, World 
Trade Organization, Geneva, 2011, pp. 6, 47. 
29 The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements: From Co-existence to Coherence// World Trade Report, World 
Trade Organization, Geneva, 2011, p. 47. 
30 On the assumption of the structure of world trade and participation of most countries in the WTO 
31 The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements: From Co-existence to Coherence// World Trade Report, World 
Trade Organization, Geneva, 2011, pp. 128-144 
32 Classic effects of trade creation and trade diversion addressed in Viner J. The Customs Union Issue// Chapter 4 in 
New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1950, pp. 41-56; Lipsey R. The theory of Customs Union: 
Trade Diversion and Welfare// Economica 24, 1957, pp. 40-46; Mundell R. Tariff Preferences and the Terms of 
Trade// Manchester School of Economics and Social Studies 32, 1-13; Panagariya A. The Meade Model of 
Preferential Trading: History, Analytics and Policy Implications// International Trade and Finance: New Frontiers 
for Research, Essays in honor of Peter B. Kenen, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997, 57-88; Max 
Corden W. (1972) Economics of Scale and Customs Union Theory // Journal of Political Economy 80, 465-475. 
 in barriers to trade with partner countries provided that the barriers against third 
countries remain unchanged33. In reality it does not always happen. Even with the 
presence of trade creation effect34 resulting from agreement conclusion, 
deterioration in aggregate social welfare may occur in respond to changes in terms 
of trade between the member countries and third countries. 
In other words, a package of measures to reduce trade barriers with one 
country could potentially mean an increase in trade barriers with other countries35. 
Another typical drawback of creating PTAs around the world is the spread 
of the so-called "spaghetti bowl" effect36, which can be defined as the process of 
complication of the world trade rules due to clustering of trading blocs and the 
establishing separate trade rules within them (an example is shown in Figure 3). 
 
                                                          
33 Refer to Bhagwati J., Paganariya A. Preferential Trading Areas and Multilateralism: Strangers, Friends or Foes?// 
Trading Blocs: Alternative approaches to analyzing preferential trade agreements, MIT, 1999, pp. 33-67 
34 Trade creation's essence is in elimination of customs tariffs on inner border of unifying states, causing further 
decrease of price of the goods, while there may be a case of new trade flow creation of the goods between the states 
decided to economically integrate. The issue was firstly brought into discussion in Viner J. The Customs Union 
Issue// Chapter 4 in New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1950, pp. 41-56. 
35 Formal proofs can be found in Bhagwati J., Panagariya A., Krishna P. Trading Blocs: Alternative approaches to 
analyzing preferential trade agreements// MIT Press, 1999, pp. 70-79 
36 The term «spaghetti bowl» was firstly used in Bhagwati J. U.S. Trade Policy: The Infatuation with Free Trade 
Agreements// in Bhagwati J., Krueger A. The Dangerous Drift to Preferential Trade Agreements, AEI Press, 1995, 
p.4 
  
Figure 3 – «Spaghetti Bowl»: PTA linkages within East Asia (by June 2007) 
Note: PTA phase development: 
Negotiating 
 Partially in force, still negotiating 
 In force 
Source: Dent C. East Asian Regionalism// Routledge, London, p. 199 
 
Increase in number of PTAs causes increase in costs of overlapping older 
agreements by more recent ones for the global trading system. If the country is a 
member of several PTAs, each of the agreements can establish rules of origin37 that 
are not harmonized with each other38. 
Furthermore, in case of discriminatory trade liberalization the country 
involved in several agreements simultaneously can face different duties for the 
                                                          
37 Rules of origin are aimed to determine whether the good or any of its part produced in the territory of a partner 
country or from local ingredients, and thus, whether it be a subject for duty-free imports or other preferential 
treatment 
38 For more details refer to Krueger A. Free trade agreements versus customs unions// Journal of Development 
Economics, Volume 54, Issue 1, October 1997, Pages 169–187. 
 same product simultaneously, since the conditions of market access for PTA 
partners are usually differentiated. 
Absence of a large number of PTAs, indicating the absence of encumbrances 
and liabilities in certain agreements and discriminatory practices is a definite 
advantage of Russia. It facilitates the integration into the world trading system that 
exists on the principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination. 
Existing integration processes (which result in conclusion of PTAs) largely 
result from the common past of Russia with partner countries (ethnic affinity, 
similar cultural characteristics, etc). Importance of direct economic impact from 
integration of Russia still remains a question. 
Underlying reasons for negotiations with Vietnam and New Zealand on the 
establishment of PTAs can be explained only partially. In particular, the potential 
conclusion of an agreement between Russia and Vietnam can be seen as a 
beachhead for entering the markets of ASEAN countries. 
Negotiations on FTA with New Zealand are conducted on behalf of the 
Customs Union of the Eurasian Economic Community. In this case it appears that 
the purpose of the Customs Union members is a confirmation of international legal 
personality of the Customs Union and the further development of the integration 
agenda. 
Thus, at the moment Russia is practicing trade negotiations with non-CIS 
countries, gaining experience and does not aim to a direct material benefit from 
cooperation in the short run. Moreover, it seems that these potential PTAs have a 
signaling role of informing other countries that Russia is ready for such forms of 
integration. 
It is obvious that is economically feasible for Russia to negotiate with China, 
the European Union, Brazil, the U.S., Chile, if the countries agree upon the fact 
that current depth of integration, achieved for example within the WTO, is not 
deep enough. On the other hand, elimination of trade barriers with any of the listed 
countries in the PTA framework can have a large negative impact on specific 
interest groups in both Russia and potential partner country. 
 The future of the PTA institution is open primarily for decision makers and 
specific interest groups who participate in distribution of benefits arising from 
trade barriers. From the point of view of social welfare there is no such a question: 
if international trade is a more efficient method of production it should be 
implemented. Policy on movement towards free trade should take into account the 
analysis of economic costs and benefits, both short- and long-run.  
The WTO, as well as other institutions that promote free trade (including 
bilateral and multilateral PTAs) is only a set of tools for policy-makers, 
economists, representatives of industries: each of listed groups to some extent are 
not ready for a redistribution of wealth in favor of the national, with overall growth 
of its magnitude. 
 Conclusion 
The majority of observers often get a false impression that trade barriers help 
the country using them and harm the country in respect of which they are applied. 
This argument is to some extent true for large economies, which can affect world 
prices on goods and services through trade policy. 
In reality, in case of small economies including Russia39, trade barriers are 
equally harmful to both countries, mainly due to a negative effect on the aggregate 
social welfare40. 
In our opinion, removal or iterative elimination of trade barriers in the 
medium run is one of the main tasks of Russian trade policy aimed at improving 
quality of life in Russia. 
In this regard, consistent work of Russia in the WTO, though potentially 
costly, due to, for example, asymmetry of information, as well as the systematic 
elimination of trade barriers to the access of foreign countries in the Russian 
market is vitally important for Russia. 
Any form of international trade integration should be used to maximize 
effect. Achievement of optimum balance in integration forms can contribute to the 
gradual progress of the country towards free trade with the rest of the world, 
including removal of discriminatory barriers that are applied in respect of Russia, 
and eventually lead to an increase of aggregate social welfare and living standards 
of Russian citizens. 
                                                          
39 Russia may have a very limited influence on world prices of goods and services 
40 For more details refer to Bhagwati J. Protectionism// MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1988, 164 pp.; 
Krueger A. Are Preferential Trading Arrangements Trade-Liberalizing or Protectionist?// The Journal of Economic 
Perspective, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Autumn, 1999), pp. 105-124. 
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